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Para atingir maior robustez foi executada uma análise de sensibilidade incluindo análise 
de cenários múltiplos, com o fim de testar várias projecções de receitas, e variações em 
variáveis específicas. 
Por fim, foi efectuada uma comparação com um relatório da J. P. Morgan para comparar 
os resultados desta dissertação com o de um banco de investimento. A conclusão final da 
dissertação foi de recomendar Venda sobre o LinkedIn, pois esta apresentou um preço de 
fecho no dia 1 de Dezembro de 2015 de $ 249,82. Em contraste a J. P. Morgan apresentou 
uma recomendação de Compra com preço alvo de $ 300. 
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1 Literature Review 
The cornerstone of finance lies in valuation. It is of the utmost importance for a company 
to be able to assess the return its decisions will bring to its stakeholders. Similarly, it is 
the role of a portfolio manager to find undervalued companies to present high yields to 
its clients. 
Regardless of its central role in finance, valuation is not a straightforward subject. In fact, 
it is a very volatile topic, (Demirakos, Strong, & Walker, 2004) explore the different 
models used by analysts and one of their conclusions is that they “tailor their valuation 
methodologies to the circumstances of the industry”. Yet, even when using the same 
methodologies for the same company two analysts can come up with very different results 
depending on the assumptions undertaken by each of them.  
Therefore, the challenge presents itself, which are the optimal methodologies to use in 
order to correctly assess the value of LinkedIn?  
In this chapter I will look at the different methods of valuing a company. (Damodaran A. 
, 2006) states there are 4 general approaches to this subject: discounted cash flow 
valuation, liquidation and accounting valuation, relative valuation and contingent claim 
valuation. 
My goal will be to delve into each of these methods pointing out their strengths and 
weaknesses with the final intent of choosing the best methods to value LinkedIn. 
1.1 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
Discounted cash flow (DCF) models use future cash flow projections discounted at an 
appropriate rate to reach the present value for the firm. The models differ between each 
other through the discount factor and the assumptions taken to reach both the cash flow 
estimates and terminal value. There are “ten methods: free cash flow; equity cash flow; 
capital cash flow; APV (Adjusted Present Value); business’s risk-adjusted free cash flow 
and equity cash flow; risk-free rate-adjusted free cash flow and equity cash flow; 
economic profit; and EVA.”1  
                                                          
1 Fernandez, P. (2007). Valuing Companies by Cash Flow Discounting: Ten Methods and Nine Theories. Journal of Management 
Science , 1 (1), 83-102. 
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For the purpose of this section I will look over the most important and widely used 
methods within DCF, focusing on the ones more relevant for LinkedIn. 
1.1.1 Free Cash Flow 
Free cash flow method states that the total value of a company – Equity plus Debt – is 
obtained from the present value of expected free cash flows (FCF) discounted at the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
As can be seen in equation (1), FCF is the total cash a company has available after settling 
the maintenance and expansion of its asset base. It can be calculated from earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) discounted by the tax rate (T) adding depreciation and 
amortization (D&A) and discounting the changes in net working capital and capital 
expenditures (CAPEX). 
𝐹𝐶𝐹 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇(1 − 𝑇) +  𝐷&𝐴 − ∆𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋             (1) 
Equation (2) shows that WACC takes into consideration all forms of capital, given their 
proportional weight. Therefore, the cost of equity (Re) and the cost of debt (Rd) are 
proportionally weighted through the percentage of financing that is equity (E/V) and debt 







∗ 𝑅𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇)                                       (2) 
Therefore, the value of a firm through the FCF/WACC method is as given by equation 
(3). The second half of the equation is what is known as the terminal value, which is 











                                   (3) 
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1.1.2 Equity Cash Flow 
“In equity valuation models, we focus our attention of the equity investors in a business 
and value their stake by discounting the expected cash flows to these investors at a rate 
of return that is appropriate for the equity risk in the company.”2 
Therefore, this method consists in regarding the true value of a company in respect to the 
cash generated towards common equity holders. As can be seen from equation (4) equity 
cash flow (ECF) is a function of net income (NI), depreciation and amortization (D&A), 
capital expenditure (CAPEX), change in working capital and net borrowing (NB). 
𝐸𝐶𝐹 = 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐷𝐴 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 − ∆𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑁𝐵                     (4) 
In order to reach the value of the company we need to discount these cash flows by the 
cost of equity (Ke) which gives us the return demanded by investors from the company. 
Equation (5) shows us how to reach this value. 
𝐾𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) ∗ 𝛽                                                  (5) 
Where: 
 rf = risk free rate 
 rm – rf = market risk premium 
 β = unsystematic risk 
Similarly, to the FCF method, the value of a company through the ECF method is 
therefore given, as seen in equation (6), by discounting the future cash flows and terminal 













                                                          
2 Damodaran, A. (2006). Valuation Approaches and Metrics: A Survey of the Theory and Evidence. Stern School of Business, New 
York University. 
LinkedIn Corp                                  Equity Valuation 
11 
 
1.1.3 Adjusted Present Value 
“Today’s better alternative for valuing a business operation is to apply the basic DCF 
relationship to each of a business’s various kinds of cash flow and then add up the present 
values.”3 
The prevalence of WACC is directly correlated to its simplicity of use. However, its 
simplicity is both its strength and weakness. WACC agglomerates all sources of tax 
shields into one parameter – 1 minus corporate tax – and how many companies today can 
simplify their corporate tax structure in such a way? It is very limited in estimating the 
tax shields and is more appropriate for companies where the capital structure is expected 
to remain stable. This next model presents itself as a solid way to correct these issues and 
yield a more solid valuation. 
Adjusted Present Value (APV) divides itself into three main sections; present value of 
cash flows discounted by the unlevered cost of equity (Ke), present value of interest tax 







𝐼𝑇𝑆 + 𝐸𝐵𝐶                                              (7) 
Therefore, the first step is to calculate the value of the company as if it was fully financed 
through equity, then adding the ITS and EBC. 
Regarding the tax shields “there are several theories regarding which are the fundamental 
determinants behind this tax shield formula” (Fernandéz, 2007). However, for the purpose 
of this literature review, I will focus on Myers theory that discounts the costs of financing 
by the cost of debt (Kd) which is given by equation (8). 
𝐼𝑇𝑆 =
𝐷 × 𝑇 × 𝐾𝑑
𝐾𝑑
                                                           (8) 
𝐸𝐵𝐶 = 𝑃𝐷 × 𝐵𝐶                                                              (9) 
Finally, in regards to bankruptcy costs, this can be calculated by simply multiplying the 
probability of default (PD) by the bankruptcy costs (BC) as seen by equation (9). The 
                                                          
3 Luerhman, T. A. (1997). What's It Worth? A General Manager's Guide to Valuation. Harvard Business Review , 132-142. 
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issue is the vagueness of the equation itself in regards to probability of default. To answer 
this issue Damodaran suggests using the corporate bond rate if applicable. 
1.1.4 Economic Value Added 
“The value of a business depends on its return on invested capital (ROIC) and growth.”4 
The fundamental theory behind Economic Value Added (EVA) is that the true value of a 
company can be measured by correctly estimating its surplus value created. This model 
is derived from the DCF model and is a good measure for the return an investor can expect 
from financing a company. 
Therefore, as can be seen in equation (10), the value of a company calculated through 
EVA is given by multiplying the difference between ROIC and the cost of capital (Ka) 
by the total invested capital (IC). 
𝐸𝑉𝐴 = (𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 − 𝐾𝑎) × 𝐼𝐶                                                  (10) 
The company’s enterprise value is then reached by adding the “capital invested in assets 
in place, (plus) the present value of the economic value added by these assets and the 
expected present value of the economic value that will be added by future investments”5.  
The main issues with this model is the fact that it favors assets in place in regards to future 
growth prospects, thus limiting in certain company analysis. 
1.2 Dividend Discount Model 
The Dividend Discount Model (DDM) is a cash flow based model which uses issued 
dividends as inputs to value a company’s stock. The model proposed by Gordon et al. 
(1956) states that given knowledge of a company’s price, dividend and future growth rate 
we can reach a valuation showing whether a company is undervalued or otherwise in the 
markets. 
                                                          
4 Koller, T., Goedhart, M., & Wessels, D. (2010). Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies. John Wiley and 
Sons. 
5 Damodaran, A. (2002). Investment Valuation, Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset (2nd ed.). New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
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The issue with this model is that it requires that a company be expected to issue dividends, 
which is not the case for LinkedIn and making it unfeasible to use as a means of valuing 
it. Moreover, it doesn’t take in consideration the effects of investments by the company 
and requires quite stable conditions in order to lead to solid results, since even small 
changes in the assumptions can have drastically different values.  
1.3 Relative Valuation 
Relative or Multiples Valuation is, in addition to discounted cash flow models, one of the 
most popular company valuation tools. As (Baker & Ruback, 1999) state, “it applies the 
only the most basic concept in economics: perfect substitutes should sell for the same 
price.” The idea behind this method is exactly that, to reach a company’s value by 
applying its fundamentals to average industry ratios. Its ease of use and simplicity are the 
main reasons it is so popular among industry professionals. Furthermore, being easily 
understood by all levels of financial knowledge has truly consolidated its place in 
valuation. 
In effect, (Suozzo, Cooper, Sutherland, & Deng, 2001) state that the main advantages of 
multiples valuation are simplicity (easy to calculate and interpret), usefulness (can 
provide useful information about relative value) and relevance (focuses on main statistics 
that most investors follow).  
Furthermore, as (Goedhart, Koller, & Wessels, 2005) state, “a properly executed 
multiples analysis can make financial forecasts more accurate.” By combining multiples 
analysis to an already existing DCF valuation one can check for inconsistencies and could 
even serve as basis to know the range of values one is expected to reach. Therefore, 
multiples valuation always adds more value and robustness to a valuation report. 
However, as with all models, there are some drawbacks. According to (Suozzo, Cooper, 
Sutherland, & Deng, 2001) the mains disadvantages are: simplicity (dilution of 
information), static (“snapshot of where a firm is in time”) and difficult to compare (no 
two companies are truly the same).  
On top of that (Goedhart, Koller, & Wessels, 2005) add another issue, we have to be wary 
when analyzing multiples as different multiples can present different conclusions about 
the same company, therefore a more comprehensive analysis of the company is necessary 
to truly find the relevant multiples.  
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(Suozzo, Cooper, Sutherland, & Deng, 2001) separate multiples into two basic groups, 
enterprise multiples, which are connected to the value of the entire business, and equity 
multiples, which only values a company’s equity (the shareholder’s claim to the 
company). 
The main multiples of the enterprise group are Enterprise Value (EV) / Sales, which is a 
very simple multiple but less vulnerable to accounting differences. EV / EBITDA which 
is the most used enterprise multiple due to being unaffected by both differences in 
depreciation policy and capital structure. Finally, we have EV / EBIT which is better than 
EBITDA when capital intensities are different within the industry. 
Regarding equity multiples, the main ones are Price / Earnings (PER), which is incredibly 
popular especially due to the ease of access to the required historical data. Price / Book 
Value is commonly used when the main source of value generation stems from the 
business’s tangible assets. To conclude we have Price / Cash Earnings that is usually an 
addition to existing valuation methods due to the simplified manner in which Cash 
Earnings are defined that leave out many possible value generation indicators. 
Additionally, we can also refer to Transaction Multiples which are taken from actual 
acquisitions. The idea behind these multiples is that the companies were valued at fair 
value and therefore are a good estimate for the price at which the company we’re studying 
would be sold for. With an appropriately sized peer group of relevant (similar) types of 
acquisitions we reach multiples that should portray the value which the market would be 
willing to pay for the company. 
Finally, we have a specific group of multiples for Social Media and Internet based 
companies regarding industry specific operating indicators, which can prove relevant in 
estimating LinkedIn’s true Enterprise Value. These multiples are, among others, 
Price/Active Monthly Users (MAU). 
1.4 Contingent Claim Valuation 
Contingent Claim Valuation or Option Pricing has two main applications, as presented 
by (Schwartz, 2013), which are in the natural resources industry (for example mining) 
and Research and Development (R&D).  
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In its essence this method strives to fully appraise the different options or decisions within 
a business. This is clearer in the case of natural resources, as it takes into account the 
different outcomes regarding output and price fluctuation, even adding the risk of closing 
the mine by calculating minimum price for production. 
However, there are many drawbacks to this method, namely the amount of different 
variables that are necessary in order to calculate it thoroughly and the difficulty in 
obtaining said values (namely volatility). Given these conditions and the difference 
between LinkedIn’s industry and the main businesses where Option Pricing can be 
effective other methods will be preferred in order to reach its value. 
1.5 Liquidation and Accounting Valuation 
The overall idea of this method is that “the value of a business is the sum of the values of 
the individual assets owned by the business.”6 This model presents two different 
approaches: Book Value Based Valuation and Liquidation Valuation. 
Book Value Based Valuation is firmly based upon a thorough analysis of a company’s 
balance sheets and income statements. Various issues arise from this method, namely; do 
historical accounts present a strong approximation for future cash flows? Can we easily 
compare market and book values? Yet this hasn’t stopped many investors from 
calculating underpricing by comparing market values to book values of businesses. The 
best use of this method is “for mature firms with predominantly fixed assets, little or no 
growth opportunities and no potential for excess returns”6, which is not the case of 
LinkedIn. 
In regards to Liquidation Valuation, this method is “based upon the presumption that they 
have to be sold now.”6 The main difference between this model and a DCF method is that 
it implies a sense of urgency and can lead to either a discount due to a “fire-sale” effect 
or can lead to a premium depending on demand from potential buyers that might result in 
and auction situation. 
                                                          
6 Damodaran, A. (2006). Valuation Approaches and Metrics: A Survey of the Theory and Evidence. Stern School of Business, New 
York University. 
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Overall the main use of this type of valuation is for companies that are in distress and 
methods which imply terminal values and continuous growth rates are not a realistic 
approach. Once again it is not the case that best fits with LinkedIn. 
1.6 Conclusion 
After a detailed analysis of the various methods available for the valuation of LinkedIn I 
believe that the best course of action is to proceed with a combination of 2 of the methods 
presented in the literature review. 
The first method I will use is Relative Valuation, since it provides a good basis for further 
valuation methods and gives more robustness to a valuation report. The main multiples I 
will use are PER and EV/EBITDA given that they are the most commonly used multiples 
in valuation and complement the analysis with others to increase the robustness of the 
results. My goal with this step is to reach values that can provide guidelines for the rest 
of the process, with the intent of setting a base value of comparison. I will then 
compliment these base multiples with more specific and industry specific indicators such 
as MAU users and Transaction Multiples. 
Finally, I will perform an APV valuation, I choose this method over WACC or ECF due 
to LinkedIn’s recent capital structure changes due to continued acquisition and 
investment strategies which are expected to continue. It is stated in the company’s annual 
report that LinkedIn intends to continue its acquisition strategy and R&D expenses and 
will look to finance them with more equity issues and debt if necessary. Adding to this 
information the issued convertible senior notes and employee stock-based compensation 
plans up until 2021 it is guaranteed that the company will experience capital structure 
shifts in the coming years.  
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2 Industry Overview 
To fully evaluate LinkedIn, it is necessary to consider the industry where the company 
operates and which sectors it influences. Moreover, the analysis of historical data and the 
features of its market will allow making educated predictions about future perspectives 
as well as understand its evolution. 
On the other hand, it is fundamental to, after having studied the industry overall, analyze 
LinkedIn in particular in terms of evolution, strategy and the actions that allowed the 
company to be so successful as it is.   
Finally, data from the US market will be very relevant, since the company is North 
American and it has the highest per-capita rate of users (close to 30%), despite United 
Kingdom and Canada having very high rates as well (around 22 and 26%, respectively).  
2.1 Global Overview 
LinkedIn is included in the Social Network Market, which is an Industry of close to $25 
Billion Dollars (in 2015) in terms of revenues, encompassing advertising revenues as well 
as other sources and it is predicted to keep growing exponentially, reaching $80 Billion 
Dollars by 2020 worldwide. Moreover, the number of users has also increased throughout 
the years, from 2.177 Billion in 2015, to an expected 2.5 Billion in 2017, with North 
America having the most users, and Asian-Pacific the highest increasing market. Besides 
being a very attractive market, due to its exponential growth (in terms of revenues and 
users) over the course of the last decade and its future expectations, Social Networks 
provide benefits for both individuals and companies, which reinforce the Industry’s 
importance and assure present (and future) investment of both time and financial 
resources into developing and customizing the different social media platforms to 
people’s goals and objectives.  
For companies, benefits include: the increased knowledge and familiarity with 
organizations/products/services (which can translate into more visits to the company’s 
website for instance), feedback about hypothetical future products/services, customer 
appreciation and suggestions for improvement, better focused marketing campaigns, 
understanding the positive and negative comments and where products/services are 
struggling or being successful and why, improve a company’s external perception, 
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identify new opportunities and allow companies to find suitable talent for available 
positions. As for individuals, it can increase one’s technological understanding and make 
them feel more comfortable with it; it helps bring people closer to one another and the 
opportunity to meet people that in regular circumstances would not be possible; increase 
knowledge about subject matters that users might not be initially interested or simply did 
not know about; it helps individuals present themselves by referring personal 
achievements, features and preferences; it can help people launch businesses, part-time 
hobbies or have companies/organizations seeing their profile and increasing their chances 
to be hired.  
In summary, the Social Network Industry has been increasingly growing in terms of 
revenues, importance and number of users worldwide, benefitting both individuals and 
companies in professional and personal aspects. The next sub-topic will address the 
Porter’s Five Forces analysis to further understand the industry’s features and 
attractiveness.  
2.2 Porter’s Five Forces Analysis 
2.2.1 Rivalry between competitors 
When considering Professional/Business-oriented networks, LinkedIn is the leader, being 
ahead of companies such as Viadeo and XING, by having a global database of skilled 
and/or experienced individuals as well as being available in more than 24 languages, and 
more than 200 countries, leading to a more internationalized strategy and be more 
globally expanded. On the other hand, LinkedIn was able to keep a strong position as a 
leader in the hiring industry, by fulfilling companies’ needs. Moreover, LinkedIn also 
operates as a SNS (Social Networking Service) where it provides the possibility for clients 
to engage and view people’s profiles, based on general professional interests. This leads 
to the ability to find suitable opportunities for job seekers, while keeping a social 
interactivity, meaning that companies can address candidates primarily, before, and 
decide to hire the best candidate afterwards.  
Although LinkedIn has been able to maintain a position of leadership in the Professional 
Networking Service (PNS), while competing with organizations such as Monster and 
CareerBuilder, it also ends up entering the market and suffering competition from Social 
Networking Services, such as Facebook and Twitter. On the other hand, although 
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LinkedIn is a leader in the PNS environment, the market is very volatile, jeopardizing its 
position, and the fact that consumer preferences can change very unexpectedly. Finally, 
although LinkedIn offers a wide variety of features and options (free and premium) attract 
a lot of different segments (organizations, professionals and marketing agencies), there is 
not much product differentiation that allows LinkedIn to breathe comfortably in this type 
of environment. Having stated this, the competition and rivalry in the industry is 
moderate.  
2.2.2 Threat of Substitutes 
The threat of new substitutes is always related to the appearance of new Professional 
Networking Services features in existing websites and Social Networking Services (either 
new, or existing ones evolving into this segment too). Having said that, individuals can 
also search job offers in other platforms such as Facebook, for example, if the company 
involved does not use PNS. Other substitutes include the traditional hiring channels and 
online job advertisement. Due to possible entrance of new service substitutes and the 
existing ones in the market, the threat of substitutes can be considered moderate.  
2.2.3 Threat of New Entrants 
One can argue that the difficulty in creating a global network such as LinkedIn was able 
to create over the years can minimize to some extent the possibility of new entrants. On 
the other hand, established companies in this market, which are now more comfortable 
with fixed costs and enjoying economies of scale, enjoy a clear advantage, in the case a 
new entrant decides to come forth. Moreover, companies such as LinkedIn had the 
opportunity to build strong and trustful relationships with both companies and 
professionals as well as become a well-known multi-lingual brand on the PNS sector (in 
which switching costs for companies is high). These previous factors managed to create 
a high barrier of entry for newcomers. 
However, the initial investment to enter this market is relatively low, being moderately 
easy to find investors, especially if a newcomer wants to take its activity to developing 
countries, where the potential growth of this market is even higher. Also, existing SNS 
have economies of scope over PNS, adding to the fact that SNS are traditionally used to 
having much more users (Facebook, for example) and dealing with the more demanding 
Internet traffic (in both terms of cost efficiency and performance). These SNS can 
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constitute a threat if they develop features specifically for this market or by aligning 
themselves with new players and take advantage of their large database. Finally, there is 
also the probability of new job services and companies deeply related to technology 
(Microsoft, for instance) that can take advantage of their financial resources and 
experience in dealing with huge databases and traffic. Therefore, the threat of new 
entrants is moderate-to-high.  
2.2.4 Bargaining Power of Buyers 
Customers in PNS are mainly individuals/professionals and companies and neither 
segment is concentrated. On the other hand, in the PNS sector, LinkedIn is leading rather 
comfortably, which makes it more famous and reliable than its competitors, helping the 
current users to stay. Also, LinkedIn, by providing innovative services and showing 
adaptability to market trends, allows it to keep leading this market.  
However, the good reputation that companies such as LinkedIn enjoy took many years to 
build, but it can end very swiftly with a small decrease in performance or quality. 
Therefore, taking everything into consideration, the bargain power in the customer side 
is low-to-moderate.  
2.2.5 Suppliers’ Bargaining Power 
In this industry there are many suitable service providers. There are database services, 
mobile and applications that can fulfill companies’ requirements and that can be 
ultimately bought (LinkedIn acquired Bizo and Refresh.io, for example). On the other 
hand, professionals and companies can build their own network and connect to each other 
worldwide. Therefore, the suppliers’ bargaining power is relatively low.  
2.3 Company Overview 
LinkedIn is a Professional Networking Service and it is mostly used for professional 
networking. It was founded in 2003 and most of its revenues come from access to 
information about users by recruiters. Nowadays it has over 400 Million users, evolving 
from 20 Million in (2006) and it is present in more than 200 countries. In 2013 it had 184 
Million unique visitors worldwide and revenues in 2014 hit 2.2 Billion Dollars mark. It 
is the undisputed leader in the PNS sector, although it also competes in some aspects with 
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the SNS sector. To further understand the company’s capabilities and downfalls, a SWOT 
Analysis will be presented in the next sub-topic. 
2.4 SWOT Analysis 
2.4.1 Strengths 
First of all, the company has enough financial resources to fund their projects and 
investments, which means that they do not require external investment or incurs in debt. 
Secondly, LinkedIn is a reliable and premium professional networking service, where a 
study from ROI research shows that 59% of the answers stated that LinkedIn was their 
most useful and main social network account, and 87% used LinkedIn as a tool to decide 
between candidates, job offers and companies. Thirdly, the company has several different 
revenue streams such as premium accounts, advertisements and job postings. Fourthly, it 
enjoys the position of first-mover and undisputed leadership in the market, which allows 
it to watch trends worldwide and try to establish some of their own. Finally, it is present 
in more than 200 countries (globally) and encompasses a wide range of professionals.  
2.4.2 Weaknesses 
The first weakness is related to privacy concerns and security issues: since users share 
personal information, this information must be secured. However, in 2012, 6.5 Million 
passwords were posted online by hackers, showing a considerable security breach. 
Secondly, the cultural differences and weak acceptance outside United States, Canada 
and the UK show a weak penetration of LinkedIn, with special attention being placed in 
China and India (7.72% in India for example). Also, the tradeoff between LinkedIn and 
SNS is not very solid (only 2% of Facebook users have LinkedIn accounts, but 40% of 
LinkedIn users have Facebook accounts) as well as the amount of time spent (LinkedIn 
averages 6.5 minutes/user/day, while Facebook averages more than 55 minutes/user/day).  
2.4.3 Opportunities 
Everyone is a potential customer. 
Any person (or organization) looking for a job (or a candidate), respectively, is a potential 
customer. On the other hand, LinkedIn being the leader in the PNS industry, is the most 
qualified to tap into the Asian and Indian market, where it is currently struggling in terms 
of users. Moreover, professional videos, training and experience feedback can be 
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presented in the website, exploring more of the Social Networking Service (despite still 
being business-oriented) sector. Finally, using Internet in everyday activities has 
increasingly become more and more popular: candidates can be chosen more often from 
PNS than by sending CVs and motivational letters.  
2.4.4 Threats 
The possibility of new competition either thanks to new services or social networks 
bridging the gap between social and professional oriented can lead to a much more 
competitive market for LinkedIn. On the other hand, as previously mentioned, the good 
reputation acquired by LinkedIn can disappear very swiftly. Furthermore, many 
candidates could be hired by other methods than PNS. Also, users can state unreliable 
information and inaccurate data, undermining the whole hiring process. Finally, XING 
can have easier access to the Asian market and when LinkedIn tries to focus on both 
companies and individuals/professionals, it can unintentionally alienate one or the other.  
2.5 Future Expectations 
LinkedIn aspires to create a comprehensive display of all job positions available 
worldwide, the skills needed to apply for that position and what expected from candidates, 
making the work environment more transparent. In terms of investments, they will be 
applied in technology structure (performance, security, etc.), product development (better 
features and more innovative products); sales and marketing; international expansion to 
enlarge the member database; legal and accounting expenses due to its global presence 
and being a public company. 
  




In this chapter I will present the data and methodologies relevant for the development of 
my model and subsequent valuation. The next 4 chapters will be divided as follows; the 
first chapter focuses on the forecasts and assumptions made in order to achieve the 
necessary data about LinkedIn’s future prospects7; the following chapter is the model 
results, through both the multiples and APV approaches; the third chapter is focused on 
sensitivity analysis, the possible variations in the outcomes of the aforementioned 
approaches; finally the fourth chapter compares the results of this thesis with those of an 
equity research report on LinkedIn by J. P. Morgan. 
3.1 Forecasts 
This section is a fundamental part of the valuation process. In order to achieve a robust 
price target for a company you must be able to accurately forecast its future prospects to 
understand their value today. The goal of the next few pages is to explain the assumptions 
and thought process behind the forecasts by going over the main figures of both the 
income statement and balance sheet that impacted the final values obtained. 
3.1.1 Revenues 
Revenues are the key item in most forecasts as they impact the entire income statement 
and are the first step in the cash flow estimation. Therefore, reaching a robust revenue 
estimation is a major part of obtaining a well-rounded valuation. 
For the specific case of LinkedIn there are several points to take into consideration. 
Firstly, LinkedIn has only been publicly traded for a few years, so there isn’t much in 
terms of historical data so as to infer future growth prospects or performance.  
Secondly, it is experiencing high growth therefore we cannot take the average of the last 
few years as a reasonable growth rate for the future and furthermore implies that we need 
to have a relatively wide window of estimation in order to look towards LinkedIn’s 
stabilization period.  
                                                          
7 For LinkedIn’s historical and forecasted Income Statements, Balance Sheets and Cash Flow Statements 
refer to the Appendix. 
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Finally, LinkedIn is the most mature company (in terms of market penetration and product 
development) in its specific market, therefore we cannot look towards similar companies’ 
history to infer a possibly similar evolution for LinkedIn.  
To address the issue of LinkedIn’s current growth the forecast period will take place until 
2025 to take into consideration a high growth and stabilization period. Which will allow 
for an appropriate calculation of the company’s terminal value. 
LinkedIn’s revenue sources were broken down to allow easier analysis. The company’s 
revenues stem from 3 sources: Talent Solutions, Marketing Solutions and Premium 
Subscriptions.  
 
Figure 1 - Revenue Breakdown in 2015 by source 
Talent Solutions “aim to be the most effective way for enterprises and professional 
organizations to efficiently identify and acquire the right talent for their needs.”8 It 
comprises all products LinkedIn has available for companies and individuals in terms of 
job postings and search engines within the platform. 
LinkedIn’s Learning department, which was started with the acquisition of Lynda.com a 
web-based learning platform, is also included in Talent Solutions. Its goal is to provide 
users with the tools to develop new skills and reach a wider student market. 
Historically speaking Talent Solutions has represented more than half of total revenues. 
It is expected that this source of revenue maintains its status as main cash flow provider, 
                                                          




Talent Solutions Marketing Solutions Premium Subscriptions
LinkedIn Corp                                  Equity Valuation 
25 
 
given the investments made by the company in sales force and training and the future 
prospects set forth in the annual report.  
Marketing Solutions (which are usually the main revenue source in Social Media 
companies) is expected to grow more rapidly due to the shift in focus towards advertising. 
The company has the goal to truly take advantage of advertising spaces (up to 2014 the 
mobile app was poorly optimized for advertisement – a major deterrent to possible 
clients).  
Premium Subscriptions are broken down into two sources: LinkedIn’s subscription 
Service and the new Sales Navigator product. The company’s subscription packages are 
“designed for general professionals to manage their professional identity, grow their 
networks and connect with talent.”9 Whereas Sales Navigator is a tool for users to quickly 
manage and take advantage of new opportunities within LinkedIn’s user database. 
Premium Subscriptions are the lowest revenue source and given its specificity the 
company hasn’t presented any plans to leverage these results so it is expectable that it 
grows constantly with the user base.  
Sales Navigator is a diversification move for LinkedIn and, while it still represents a 
relatively small portion of total revenues, presents high synergy potential with the 
platform. Since it is quite recent, future growth can only be estimated based on potential 
future market capitalization. 
As for the growth rates applied to the revenue forecast, it was not reasonable to estimate 
this figure from past results nor are there mature peers from whom to extrapolate these 
values. Furthermore, given lack of information disclosed regarding number of clients and 
revenue per client, growth through client growth would be far too speculative. 
Hence, the path chosen was to look at LinkedIn’s potential market by revenue source 
(made available by LinkedIn) and estimate the company’s market capitalization per 
market in steady state.  
                                                          
9From LinkedIn Annual Report 2014 




Chart 1 - LinkedIn Current and Potential Market, in millions of dollars as of 2015 
The potential and current market of premium subscriptions isn’t represented in Chart 1 
due to it not being linked to a dollar weighted market cap. Potential market in terms of 
membership is total world labor force, currently at 3,4 billion, of which LinkedIn has 
around 400 million registered members representing a ~12% market penetration. 
Talent Solutions Learning Marketing Solutions Sales Navigator 
7,35% 0,45% 1,77% 1,50% 
 Table 1 – Current Market Cap as percentage of Potential Market 
Table 1 shows that the most mature market segment for LinkedIn is Talent Solutions. It 
is of note that Sales Navigator and Learning have only existed for a year. 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
Talent Solutions 27000 27756 28533 29332 30153 30998 31866 32758 33675 34618 35587 
Learning 30000 30840 31704 32591 33504 34442 35406 36398 37417 38464 39541 
Marketing Solutions 45000 46260 47555 48887 50256 51663 53109 54596 56125 57697 59312 
Sales Navigator 15000 15420 15852 16296 16752 17221 17703 18199 18708 19232 19771 
Table 1 - Potential Market Per Year in Millions of Dollars 
Table 2 was built taking potential market value estimated by LinkedIn in 2015 and 
applying the average World GDP up until 2025. 
For member growth we assume that LinkedIn will continue its current growth ratio 
effectively doubling its current 400million user base to 800million by 2025. This 
growth’s direct impact will be in percentage of users signing up for premium 
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However, in order to achieve more robustness with this sort of analysis, 3 different 
revenue scenarios will be studied in the sensitivity analysis section so as to cover a wider 
range of outcomes. 
For the purposes of this chapter only one scenario will be analyzed – the Base Case. This 
scenario will be a mix  between optimistic and realistic assumptions on the future revenue 
streams of LinkedIn. 
This Base Case estimates that by maturity LinkedIn will achieve the following market 
capitalizations: 
Talent Solutions Learning Marketing Solutions Sales Navigator 
25% 5% 5% 10% 
Table 2 - Market Cap by Maturity, as percentage of potential market 
In the Base Case it is expected that LinkedIn become a market leader in the Talent 
Solutions market and a relevant player in the remaining markets. Learning shows a lower 
level than Sales due to being a very recent and unproven market. Marketing Solution has 
proven a difficult market for LinkedIn to take a part of, and with the strong competition 
of other social networks will be difficult to become a leading player. 
Chart 2 - Revenue Projections (in millions $) 
3.1.2 Operating Expenses 
These costs are divided, within LinkedIn, in two: General and Administrative and Sales 
and Marketing. An analysis of past results shows these values to be at a comparatively 
high percentage of total revenues when compared to peers. This is due to high costs of 
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General and Administrative includes all employee compensations, except marketing and 
sales departments, as well as outside consulting, legal and accounting services. It is 
expected to remain in line with revenue for 2015 and in this scenario expected to increase 
with revenue albeit with a lower margin. 
Sales and Marketing include employee compensations for all marketing and sales 
departments. Furthermore, includes costs with branding, public relations and advertising 
commissions payed to outside agencies in order to increase global footprint of the 
company, a major focus for the future. Growth in line with General and Administrative. 
Another key driver of these costs is employee stock-based compensation, a very common 
expense given the maturity level of the company. This compensation scheme is scheduled 
to end by 2021 and from that point onwards it is expected to see a compensation in the 
work remuneration to make up the difference. 
In steady state it is an industry standard to aim for a total margin of around 38% so it is 
visible through the model a gradual shift from the current 48% of revenues towards that 
much lower value around stabilization. 
 
Chart 3 - Operating Expenses in millions of dollars, and percentage of revenues 
3.1.3 Capex and Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E) 
In regards to Capex, this variable was calculated as the difference between current year 
PP&E minus current accumulated depreciations and previous year PP&E minus previous 
year depreciations. In effect Capex is the increase in PP&E from one year to the other 
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PP&E increase was estimated as a constant percentage of revenues, as it was believed to 
be the necessary investment in fixed assets to ensure growth and a certain level of 
revenues. This conclusion was derived from the constant growth rate in PP&E of the last 
few years for LinkedIn, which were in line with its revenues. 
Similarly, depreciation was calculated on a percentage base given the values and growth 
rate of past years in these values.  
3.1.4 Debt 
LinkedIn has very little debt consisting solely of bonds issued in 2014 maturing in 2019. 
For the purposes of this model it is assumed that LinkedIn will strive to always hold the 
optimal level of debt, as a function of interest tax shields gain and probability of default 
incurred with each level of debt, in order to maximize firm value. 
Given the market rating towards the current bonds LinkedIn has issued it is not beneficial 
for LinkedIn to incur in more debt until the bonds mature in November 2019. This model 
assumes that LinkedIn only increases its debt to optimal levels in 2020, when the rating 
is a synthetic rating given by LinkedIn’s ratio between EBIT and Interest Expense 
(interest coverage ratio). 
As is explained in the interest tax shields section, interest expenses include operating lease 
expenses. 
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3.1.5 Working Capital 
Working Capital is the difference between current assets and current liabilities of a 
company and is an important figure to value a company’s health and to compute its DCF. 
It is explained in the company’s annual report that all historical changes in working 
capital were a result of increased sales and operations. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
forecast, it was established that this value would increase accordingly with the company’s 
revenues. 
We look at current assets (current liabilities) in terms of days of sales (days of costs) 
which are based on total revenues (cost of sales) divided by 365 days. This value is then 
taken and we divide the different constituents of current assets (current liabilities) by it 
and it gives you the average amount of days it takes for the company to receive (pay) its 
rights (obligations). 
In the case of LinkedIn, the values of the past 2 years have rather stabilized and in regards 
to current assets it is close to peers such as Microsoft and Facebook, standing at 92 days 
compared to 100-110. Therefore, in total current assets it was estimated that this ratio 
would maintain in perpetuity. 
However, in the case of current liabilities the value, although also stable for the past 2 
years, is almost double the figures presented by Microsoft and Facebook. In the end it 
was decided that given LinkedIn’s specific revenue sources and operating characteristics 
(and since the values have recently stabilized) it was also assumed that these values would 
maintain in perpetuity. 
3.1.6 Margins 
A company’s operating and gross margins are of the utmost importance in forecasting 
cash flows and future earnings. In the case of LinkedIn, it is expected to suffer some shifts 
in these margins as it matures.  
In regards to gross margin, by 2014 it was around 87% which is in line with more mature 
companies and, as stated in the company’s report, is not expected to suffer large shifts.  
Contrarily, LinkedIn’s EBITDA margin of 12.3% it is quite low in comparison to its 
peers. As stated by the company and other specialists we can expect this value to shift 
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towards the market standard of around 27% in maturity, as a result of decreasing operating 
expenses. 
3.1.7 Taxes 
Although LinkedIn operates at a multinational level with operations and offices across 
the globe, in order to simplify (and also due to the volatility of the company’s effective 
tax rate over the past few years) for the purpose of the model the tax rate was set at 35% 
which is the corporate tax rate faced in the United States where the headquarters are 
located. 
3.1.8 General Assumptions 
All values up to 2014 are retrieved from the company’s annual reports and Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. 2015 values are based on the company’s estimates for the end of the year 
from their third quarter report. Finally, all values from 2016 to 2025 are forecasts based 
on the model’s assumptions and calculations. 
Given that LinkedIn has a no-dividend policy no pay-outs are included in the estimations 
and net income transitions towards retained earnings of the following year. 
Marketable securities are considered by the company to be extremely liquid and therefore 
they treat them internally as Cash and equivalents. The company justifies their increase 
in Cash and marketable securities due to a certain ratio towards the working capital 
requirements, therefore in the model these figures are calculated based on this ratio 
compensated by the increase in retained earnings. 
Additional paid-in capital and goodwill are expected to remain at last levels reported by 
the company due to the uncertainty of their shifts and changes. 
  




4.1 Multiples Approach 
As stated in the Literature Review, Multiples is the most commonly used valuation 
method by analysts. However, further research showed that very few analysts used this 
approach for LinkedIn. The reasons for this became quite clear as this approach was 
further developed. 
The key to a robust multiples valuation resides in selecting the right peer group. Not only 
do you need to find companies within the same sector, preferably competitors, but also 
that have similar operating and financial results.  
This, however, proved impossible for the particular case of LinkedIn. On the one hand 
LinkedIn is considered a Social Networking Service (SNS) in the likeness of Facebook, 
Twitter and even Alphabet’s Google+, however its revenue source and general operating 
strategy is completely different.  
Whereas other SNS rely on advertising for their revenues, capitalizing on unique visitors 
and website traffic, LinkedIn’s Marketing Solutions account for less than a third of 
revenues. On the other hand, as a Professional Networking Service (PNS) such as Viadeo 
or Xing, most of its revenues stem from direct sales to companies interested in the Talent 
Solutions product, yet LinkedIn’s completely different market position and positioning 
place make its results not comparable to either of these two companies. 
In order to show a broad range of results of using multiples as an approach to value 
LinkedIn I will present 4 tables with the summary results for Equity Multiples, Enterprise 
Value Multiples, Transaction Multiples and Monthly Active Users (MAU) Multiples. 
These values where reached by choosing a combined peer group of SNS and PNS 
companies: Alphabet, Facebook, Twitter, Xing, Viadeo, Monster Worldwide and 
Salesforce.com. 
Alphabet, Facebook and Twitter where chosen given their focus on advertising 
(LinkedIn’s Marketing Solutions) and capitalize well on their member base as social 
networks by converting them into operating results (a characteristic in common with 
LinkedIn). 
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Xing, Viadeo, Monster Worldwide and Salesforce.com where chosen due to representing 
(besides LinkedIn) the most mature and developed companies in the PNS and Talent 
Solutions market and therefore to give some weight to LinkedIn’s major source of income 
for this approach. 
Multiples Median Price Per Share ($) 
PER 42,7x 184,89 
P/BV 8,1x 88,98 
P/S 9,2x 155,12 
Table 3 - Equity Multiples 
Equity Multiples provide the largest disparity within multiples classes. PER which is 
usually a reliable multiple here shows a large disparity towards LinkedIn’s value due 
mostly to low earnings expectations in comparison to its peers. 
Multiples Median Price Per Share ($) 
EV/EBITDA 33,0x 207,15 
EV/SALES 8,8x 218,94 
EV/EBIT 56,1x 222,32 
Table 4 - EV Multiples 
In contrast EV Multiples have a much lower dispersion in terms of values, however 
LinkedIn’s EBITDA, Sales and EBIT values are not in line with any of its peers and 
therefore the validity of these results is questionable. 
Multiples Median Price Per Share ($) 
EBITDA 12,2x 88,30 
Sales 3,0x 86,84 
Table 5 - Transaction Multiples 
Transaction multiples were obtained through a Goldman Sachs report on acquisitions 
within LinkedIn’s industry (some acquired by LinkedIn itself).  
Multiples Median Price Per Share ($) 
P/MAU 0,1x 6,35 
Table 6 - MAU Multiples 
This multiple is a great example of the disparity towards some of LinkedIn’s “peers”. 
Although classified as a SNS, LinkedIn’s P/MAU is around 2.43 whereas other SNS 
companies from the peer group range close to 0.06. Which just shows that LinkedIn’s 
value as an SNS does not stem from traditional sources. 
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To summarize the results, given LinkedIn’s stock price as of the 1st of December 2015 of 
$249.82, all multiples point towards it being overpriced. However, as previously stated, 
the discrepancies in terms of fundamental operations, revenue sources, strategies and 
operational and financial results do not provide a peer group robust enough for a truly 
comparable multiples valuation. 
4.2 Adjusted Present Value Approach 
In this section the steps and results of the DCF approach through the APV method will 
be presented. As stated before, the main reason APV was chosen over WACC was due to 
the company’s commitment to pursue its investment and acquisition strategy through 
equity issues and debt. Therefore, shifts in capital structure are expected although  
difficult to forecast with precision. 
4.2.1 Unlevered Cost of Equity 
The first step is to reach LinkedIn’s unlevered firm value. Hence, we must start by finding 
what the discount rate applicable is. The method used to calculate the unlevered cost of 
equity is CAPM. Therefore, we needed three key inputs: risk-free rate, unlevered Beta 
and market risk premium. 
The risk-free rate chosen is the 10 year US Treasury Bond which, as of the 1st of 
December 2015, was trading at 2,15%. 
For the unlevered beta the method chosen was to run a regression between LinkedIn’s 
stock price variations and corresponding returns of the S&P. The regression yielded a 




1 + (1 + 𝑡)
𝐷
𝐸
                                               (11) 
Where t represents the effective tax rate, which we assume to be equal to the corporate 
tax rate of 35%. Lastly D/E represents the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm. Running this 
equation leads us to an unlevered beta for LinkedIn of 1,54. 
Lastly, market risk premium was based on the average return of the S&P for the past 10 
years deducted by the risk-free value which lead do a market risk premium of 4,99%. 
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Running the CAPM with all the variables yielded an unlevered cost of equity of 9.82%. 
4.2.2 Discounted Cash Flows 
In order to reach the unlevered firm value, we had to take the discount factor and apply it 
to the FCFF forecasted for LinkedIn up to 2025 and subsequently add the terminal value 
of the company at steady state. 
The main factor in the growth of FCFF, as can be seen in the Appendix, is due to 
increasing operating results. Since NWC isn’t expected to suffer major changes, and 
Capex and other factors are linked to growth in revenues, the growth is therefore sustained 
on the increase of the EBITDA and, subsequently, the EBIT margin. 
4.2.3 Terminal Value 
The company’s terminal value represents the value a company has in perpetuity after 
reaching steady state (constant and close to GDP growth rate). The value is obtained by 
applying the growth rate in perpetuity to the FCFF of the last year in analysis and taking 
the constant growth rate in consideration in the discount factor with the following 
equation: 
𝑇𝑉 =  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛+1
𝐾𝑒 − 𝑔
                                                                (12) 
 
Given LinkedIn’s global spectrum of operations the value used to represent growth in 
perpetuity was the average global GDP growth rate of the past 5 years of 2.8%. 
4.2.4 Unlevered Firm Value 
LinkedIn’s unlevered value, as 
presented in the literature 
review, is therefore obtained by 
adding the discounted cash 
flows up to steady state and its 
discounted terminal value. The 
following table presents a 
summary of those results.FCF 
      6 938,56    
LinkedIn Corp                                  Equity Valuation 
36 
 
Terminal Value     15 027,01    
Unlevered Firm Value     21 965,56    
Table 7 - Breakdown of unlevered firm value (in millions) 
4.2.5 Tax Benefits from Debt 
As discussed in the literature review the net value of tax benefits is debt times the tax rate 
applicable to the company. 
The tax rate, as previously presented, will be the corporate tax rate of the United States 
of America which is set at 35% for LinkedIn. 
LinkedIn’s current long-term debt, as stated in its balance sheet, comprises a bond issue 
of a total of $ 1.322,5 million. However, looking just at the company’s bonds doesn’t 
provide a full picture of LinkedIn’s interest expenses. A common practice of most 
companies is to camouflage their debt as operating leases, hiding these interests expenses 
as operating expenses and providing a much healthier perspective of its fundamentals. 
Therefore, in order to fully evaluate LinkedIn’s debt its operating leases had to be 
converted to net debt. The first step was to calculate the company’s cost of debt, which is 
gathered by adding the company’s default spread to the risk-free rate. The default spread 
is obtained given the corporate debt rating of BB+, which puts its spread at 3.25%10. This 
value added to the risk-free rate leads to a cost of debt of 5.40%. 
By applying this discount factor to operating lease information supplied by the company 
we reach a debt value of leases of $ 1.065,13 million, as can be seen on the following 
table. 
Year Commitment Present Value 
1  $114,58  $108,71  
2  $135,83  $122,27  
3  $135,72  $115,91  
4  $133,98  $108,56  
5  $132,76  $102,06  
6 and beyond  $131,76  $507,62  
Debt Value of leases    $1.065,13  
Table 8 - Operating Leases converted to Net Debt (in millions) 
The sum of these two parts of total debt of the company brings us to a total amount of 
approximately $ 2.390 million.  
                                                          
10 Table in Appendix. 
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With the interest expenses of each year, of both long term debt and operating leases we 
use the cost of debt to obtain the present value of these tax shields for each year and in 
perpetuity (in a method equal to DCF). This yields a total value of tax shields of $ 
1.606,45 million. 
4.2.6 Expected Bankruptcy Costs 
The final component in order to obtain LinkedIn’s levered firm value is the expected 
bankruptcy costs. As mentioned in the literature review, although the probability of 
bankruptcy can be obtained with some ease, bankruptcy costs are not so direct. 
For probability of bankruptcy the corporate bond default rate was the chosen method. 
Given a rating of BB+ this places LinkedIn at a default rate of 10% according to (Altman 
& Kishore, 1996). 
In regards to costs of bankruptcy these can be divided in two groups: direct and indirect 
costs. Direct costs relate to lawyer and accounting fees and all expenses related to the 
administration of the bankruptcy. It is noteworthy to mention that according to (Warner, 
1977) larger firms have considerably lower relative direct costs of bankruptcy. Whereas 
indirect costs refer to “lost profits that a firm can be expected to suffer due to significant 
bankruptcy potential”11. These costs are associated with higher costs of financing due to 
probability of default, loss of sales and in general all costs brought upon due to the 
bankruptcy scenario. 
It is clear that calculating direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy is open to interpretation 
and varies sizably with industry and company size. For direct costs of bankruptcy, I refer 
to (Altman, 1984) where an empirical analysis of direct bankruptcy costs of retail and 
industrial companies yielded a range between 4% and 11%. Since relative direct costs 
have an inverse correlation with the size of the company, it is expectable that LinkedIn 
fall within the larger category and have around 5% direct costs. 
The real challenge comes when assessing LinkedIn’s indirect cost of bankruptcy. Going 
by the same source we are pushed towards around a 10% indirect cost of bankruptcy, yet 
in this sense LinkedIn fits into a very different market segment from retail and industrial. 
In fact, it is quite expected that LinkedIn have much higher indirect costs. A clear example 
                                                          
11 Altman, E. I. (1984). A further empirical investigation of the bankruptcy cost question. Journal of 
Finance, 1067-1089. 
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of this is the dot com crash and subsequent near total value loss of a large portion of 
internet companies at the time.  
Having no real fixed assets on which to rely on and no production, an internet company 
in an unproven market segment, with mostly intangible assets and, fundamentally, a 
service provider is expected to lose most its value in a bankruptcy scenario.  
However, given the lack of empirical evidence in this regard in the following chapter a 
sensitivity analysis will be shown where several costs of bankruptcy are tested to see the 
impact on the price of LinkedIn’s stock. For the purpose of this chapter an average 
indirect cost of bankruptcy of 55% was chosen. 
In conclusion, with a probability of default of 10% and cost of bankruptcy of 60% the 
expected bankruptcy costs are given by the product of these two ratios and the unlevered 
value of the firm. This yields expected bankruptcy costs of $ 1.317,93 million. 
4.2.7 Enterprise Value 
LinkedIn’s enterprise value is thusly obtained, as presented in the literature review, by 
adding the discounted cash flows (DCF), the terminal value, the interest tax shields (ITS) 
and subtracting the expected bankruptcy costs (EBC). 
Chart 5 – EV breakdown (in millions) 
As can be seen from the previous chart the value obtained is $ 22.254,08 million. From 
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is the terminal value, which accounts for 62% of the total. This puts most of LinkedIn’s 
value after its stabilization and dependent on its growth prospects and continued 
innovation in its sector. 
4.2.8 Equity Fair Value 
Having calculated LinkedIn’s Enterprise Value, the next task is to reach its fair equity 
value (EFV), so that we can then compute its price per share. 
The function is quite simple, just add cash and cash equivalents minus net debt (ND) to 
enterprise value (EV) to reach the equity fair value. As can be seen in the following 
equation: 
𝐸𝐹𝑉 = 𝐸𝑉 + 𝑁𝐷                                                       (𝟏𝟑)  
Given cash and cash equivalents (short-term investments were also included given their 
liquidity and the company’s own statements that for all intents and purposes they consider 
those investments cash) total value of $ 4.559,3 million and a debt level (long term debt 
plus operating leases converted to debt) of $ 2.390 million, this yields a EFV of $ 24.364,8 
million. This value translates into a 4.8x terminal EBITDA multiple. 
 
Chart 6 - EFV breakdown (in millions) 
Chart 3 shows the breakdown in EFV. The main factor of note is that Net Debt is positive 
and therefore the EFV is actually higher than the EV. This comes from LinkedIn’s large 
cash reservoirs that are justified by the company as essential for its operations. Its low 
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debt ratio is quite low (due to it being linked to its interest coverage ratio which for higher 
interest expenses requires higher operating income).  
In order to obtain the EFV per share we divide this result by the total shares outstanding 
of around 130 million. This yields a result of $ 186,77 per share estimated for December 
2016. 
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5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Given the uncertain nature behind the assumptions required for the valuation process it is 
standard process to run sensitivity analysis. Theses analysis consist in seeing the impact 
on the valuation of certain changes in relevant inputs. The aim is to give the investor a 
wider understanding of underlying risks faced by the recommendation and to be able to 
take them into account for his decision given his own risk profile. 
Throughout this section several variables will be tested for the impact they have in the 
overall valuation in order to bring more robustness to this valuation and present the 
investor with possible outcome scenarios different from the base case presented in 
previous sections. On the one hand, these tests will serve to justify some assumptions 
made on the model. On the other hand, they also aim to study what can be considered 
possible and expectable variations, given the specific characteristics of certain variables. 
This section will be concluded with analysis of the three scenarios mentioned in the 
revenues section. All sensitivity analysis before that section will be run on the Base Case. 
5.1 Expected Bankruptcy Costs 
As explained in previous sections expected bankruptcy costs are difficult to estimate due 
to unpredictability in forecasting the impact of distress on a firm. The value chosen for 
bankruptcy costs was 60% and in this section we can see on table 7 the impact of 
variations on this factor. 
Prob/Cost 40,00% 50,00% 60,00% 70,00% 80,00% 
10,0%  $ 190,14   $ 188,46   $ 186,77   $ 185,09   $ 183,40  
20,0%  $ 183,40   $ 180,04   $ 176,67   $ 173,30   $ 169,93  
Table 9 - Probability of default and cost of bankruptcy sensitivity analysis 
Within 10% probability of default, which is the most robust of the two percentages given 
its empirical basis, variations of 20% up or down have only a $ 6 impact on the price. In 
the Appendix a full table of sensitivity analysis shows that significant impact on the price 
only comes when both variables change. In comparison to the base case of 60% and with 
10% probability of default it can fluctuate from plus $ 8 dollars to minus $ 6, or plus or 
minus 5% of the base case value. 
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5.2 Cost of Equity and Growth Rate 
Arguably the factors that have the largest impact (with the smallest change) are the 
discount factors for the model. In the following table we will analyze the impact of a shift 
in both those factors simultaneously.  
g/Re 8,82% 9,32% 9,82% 10,32% 10,82% 
1,8%  $ 198,65   $ 185,08   $ 173,27   $  162,91   $ 153,75  
2,3%  $ 207,67   $ 192,58   $ 179,57   $  168,25   $ 158,31  
2,8%  $ 218,18   $ 201,24   $ 186,77   $  174,30   $ 163,43  
3,3%  $ 230,60   $ 211,32   $ 195,08   $  181,21   $ 169,24  
3,8%  $ 245,49   $ 223,24   $ 204,76   $  189,18   $ 175,88  
Table 10 - Sensitivity analysis of cost of equity and stable growth 
This scenario shows much more drastic fluctuations in the valuation then the previous 
case. The valuation shows more sensitivity to changes in cost of equity then stable growth. 
Keeping growth at 2,8% and changing cost of equity yields variations between plus $ 32 
and minus $ 23. It is also interesting to note that increases in valuation due to decrease in 
cost of equity is relatively larger than the negative changes from increased cost of equity. 
The same can be said of the growth rate as can be seen from table 9. 
g/Re 8,82% 9,32% 9,82% 10,32% 10,82% 
1,8% 6% -1% -7% -13% -18% 
2,3% 11% 3% -4% -10% -15% 
2,8% 17% 8% 0% -7% -12% 
3,3% 23% 13% 4% -3% -9% 
3,8% 31% 20% 10% 1% -6% 
Table 11 - Sensitivity analysis of cost of equity and stable growth in relative terms 
Therefore, the biggest impact to LinkedIn’s value comes from the return demanded from 
its equity and not so much the impact on its steady state growth rate. A perception of 
riskier or less proven strategies from management or taking in much more debt than its 
current level could lead to investors requiring a higher return from LinkedIn and as can 
be seen from these tables that could lead to significant drops in the per share price of 
LinkedIn. 
5.3 Normal Distribution 
Given the range of possible values and combinations from the previous sensitivity 
analysis it makes sense to run statistical analysis within the ranges believed more 
probable. 
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With a range’s mean and standard deviation several Monte Carlo simulations can be run. 
A Monte Carlo simulation is (among other uses) a way to generate results within a 
probability distribution and therefore making it possible to take statistical conclusions.  
In this particular case, and with the aforementioned data, various sets of 10000 results 
were generated. Such large samples were chosen in line with the Central Limit Theorem 
which states that given a sufficiently large pool of results its arithmetic mean will be 
approximately normally distributed. Therefore, allowing for our analysis regardless of the 
underlying distribution. 
5.3.1 Cost of Equity 
First range of values analyzed were a variation of 1% plus and minus the base cost of 
equity of 8%, given the same stable growth rate of 2,8%. Since this variable has the largest 
impact on the per share value of equity it is relevant to test an acceptable level of possible 
short term variation and its impact on the value of LinkedIn.  
Mean StDev Loss Gain 
   188,78    21,66 99,5% 53,6% 
Table 12 - Summary results Cost of Equity distribution 
Table 10 shows some simple statistics related to this normal distribution, namely its mean 
and standard deviation. Assuming the 2,8% stable growth rate, the mean value expected 
with this variation actually puts the per share price of LinkedIn higher than the base case. 
However, its high standard deviation is also a relevant factor to take into consideration, 
given that it represents nearly 12% of the base case prediction value. 
Loss refers to the probability of, given this 1% fluctuation of the company’s cost of equity, 
that the per share value be lower than the closing price on December 1st. This result is 
relevant due to the fact that it points to close to 100% probability of losing value. Gain 
refers to the probability of the per share value be higher than the model prediction of $ 
186.77. The percentage of 54% for this statistic implies that the base case prediction 
actually stands on the bottom half of possible outcomes given the sensitivity analysis 
being run. However as stated previously this is a result of a decrease of 1% in the cost of 
equity having a relatively higher impact on the price than a similar change in the opposite 
direction.  
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5.3.2 Cost of Equity and Stable Growth 
A further test added a possible fluctuation in stable growth rate of 0,5% positive and 
negative added to the previous cost of equity variation. This test’s purpose was used to 
further analyze the impact on the value with a wider range of outcomes from the table 
and put into perspective a large possible result pool. 
Mean StDev Loss Gain 
190,00 23,68 99,0% 55,1% 
Table 13 - Summary results Cost of Equity and Stable Growth distribution 
Of note in this scenario is the increase in all statistics, in comparison to the previous 
section. Although this scenario included more outcomes, both positive and negative, the 
overall conclusion would be the same as the previous scenario. Clear current overpricing 
of LinkedIn’s stock. 
5.4 Multiple Scenario Approach 
As stated in the revenue projection section, three scenarios were estimated for LinkedIn’s 
possible future revenue stream. The Base Case, which was followed throughout this 
dissertation. 
The Bad Case Scenario analyzes how LinkedIn’s value would change if LinkedIn 
essentially failed as a SNS and converted completely to a PNS or job board. With little 
income coming from Marketing and no income from Learning.  
Talent Solutions Learning Marketing Solutions Sales Navigator 
20% 0% 2% 5% 
Table 14 - LinkedIn Market Cap in Bad Case 
Without synergy from LinkedIn’s SNS aspect Talent Solution wouldn’t increase as much, 
neither Sales Navigator. 
Everything else constant except revenue projection shift, the target value for the Bad Case 
is $ 120,5. This represents a steep $ 66 drop in value in comparison to the base case. Yet 
it reflects the doubts regarding LinkedIn’s inability to take advantage of its marketing 
solutions and uncertainty towards the future of the Learning department. 
Furthermore, it can also represent the possibility of larger players entering LinkedIn’s 
markets (Facebook and Alphabet). Or a fragmentation of the market into smaller more 
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specific job boards and PNS, leaving a smaller space for large “one-size-fits-all” players 
as LinkedIn. 
The Good Case looks at LinkedIn as if most of its plans and management decisions 
achieved all goals by steady state. It represents a market leader position in Talent 
Solutions and an extremely relevant position in all other business sectors (especially given 
its competitors). 
Talent Solutions Learning Marketing Solutions Sales Navigator 
30% 10% 10% 15% 
Table 15 - LinkedIn Market Cap in Good Case 
This shift in revenues would lead to a per share price of $ 284,14. This price is much more 
line with the market consensus and the investment note that will be analyzed in the next 
section. 
However as mentioned above this scenario firmly sits in LinkedIn coming out on top as 
the market leader of the PNS sector and becoming a major online player. In sum it is very 
optimistic. Especially given the tremendous shifts in market cap it expects in a 10-year 
time frame. 
With these three different scenarios, representing three different looks at LinkedIn’s 
forecasted revenues, a consensus value can be obtained by applying different probabilities 
of outcome to each price target. 
Given the extreme nature of both the Bad and Good Case this dissertation applies a 20% 
probability to each and a 60% probability to the Base Case. This therefore leads to a 
weighted average of approximately $ 193. 
A Monte Carlo approach to these values, as in the previous sensitivity analysis, yields the 
following histogram seen in chart 7. 
Therefore, applying a uniform distribution to this sample of 3 values points towards a 
same probability of occurrence between a value within the $ 115 to $ 198 bracket as 
between the $ 198 to $ 280 bracket. These large brackets are a symptom of the large 
standard deviation of this small sample and therefore any analysis of these results must 
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6 Comparison with Investment Note 
In this section the valuation achieved will be compared to that of an investment bank in 
order to add more depth to this analysis. The report chosen was published by J. P. Morgan 
(JPM) on October 30th 2015. The goal is to compare methodologies, forecasts and 
outcomes so as to ascertain the robustness of the valuation obtained in the thesis. 
6.1 Methodology 
As with this thesis JPM’s report is based on a DCF analysis. Furthermore, the report relies 
solely on this method, presenting no other valuation alternative as relative valuation, 
which further solidifies the conclusions in this thesis regarding the value of a relative 
valuation for LinkedIn. 
However, JPM’s report uses a different DCF approach. While the model used throughout 
this thesis was the APV based DCF model, JPM used the FCF based on WACC. This 
should not present an issue since theoretically both models should yield the same results, 
however the same assumptions where not used. 
A fundamental factor of difference between the two valuations is the forecast horizon. 
While in this thesis a 10-year window was used in order to account for the current high 
growth period, JPM opted for a window until 2021.  
6.2 Discount rate and stable growth rate 
As seen previously in the sensitivity analysis section, small fluctuation in the discount 
factors have extremely relevant impacts in the overall valuation. In the case of the APV 
model valuation the discount factor used was the unlevered cost of equity of 9,82%. JPM 
opted for using a WACC of 10% for the range in analysis.  
It is of note however that running the WACC with the assumptions in the model of this 
thesis the discount factor obtained would be in fact 9,4%. Therefore, the key difference 
here can be in the rest of the CAPM equation (or other method) that JPM used in order to 
reach its discount factor. The key distinctive variables in this case can be Debt to Equity 
ratio, cost of equity, cost of debt and effective tax rate. However, given LinkedIn’s debt 
level in comparison to equity, the main reason is most probably the cost of equity obtained 
by JPM, which must be higher than 10%. 
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The stable growth rate represents the value at which we expect the company to grow at 
maturity, when market is fully capitalized and the product is fully innovated and explored. 
For this reason, the thesis opted for the average GDP of the past 5 years of 2,8%. Yet in 
JPM’s report the value chosen was 3,5%, which given its narrower scope of analysis may 
have intended to leave a wider growth potential for the future and be more in line with 
growth rate of mature companies in similar sectors.  
6.3 Forecasts 
The key difference in approaches in this area was that while in this thesis the chosen 
method was to look at LinkedIn’s long-term potential market capitalization. JPM looked 
at the macro conditions of the market LinkedIn operates in and results and margins shown 
by the company’s reports, which showed not only absolute growth but also better 
efficiency. 
For the period in JPM’s report they estimated a CAGR of 23% in revenues and 30% in 
EBITDA. In the same period the forecast developed in this thesis expects a CAGR of 
19,85% in revenues and 26,55% in EBITDA. 
6.4 Overall comparison summary 
The following table presents the key factors of both valuations.  
  Thesis JPM 
Method APV WACC 
Discount rate 9,82% 10% 
Stable growth rate 2,8% 3,5% 
Period in analysis 2015-2025 2015-2021 
Price Target  $ 186,77  $ 300,00  
Table 16 - Summary comparison of both valuations 
Hence the valuation discrepancy, in per share values, is around $113 between this thesis’ 
$187 valuation and JPM’s $300 valuation. What is clear is JPM’s much more bullish 
position towards LinkedIn’s stock performance. Much higher expectations towards its 
revenue growth and margins improvement. Two different positions can be taken from 
this. 
Either JPM expects LinkedIn to be much more of a market leader in the business sectors 
it operates. Or it estimates far larger growth of LinkedIn’s potential markets (whereas this 
thesis’ approach took a bearish approach of growth in line with world GDP). 




Given the volatile and unpredictable nature of tech companies such as LinkedIn, this 
dissertation clearly presented the need to run several different methods of valuation. Since 
each method requires specific assumptions, running just one method would effectively 
cripple a valuation and result in a biased outcome. 
 Although hard to present a conclusive result, by presenting several scenarios and 
different approaches to the valuation of LinkedIn, this dissertation hoped to present an 
unbiased and complete look at the foreseeable development of LinkedIn’s share price. 
One of the main difficulties was to point out LinkedIn’s market and peers, given the 
company’s diverse business model and unique approach to the social network and 
professional network universe. This forced a compromise in peer selection for multiples 
analysis, which had to include companies that specialized in each of LinkedIn’s markets. 
Furthermore, while being in the cutting-edge is usually a synonym with success and high 
margins, it also brings about many valuation issues. The new markets LinkedIn is 
exploring make any future revenue stream forecast very dependent on assumptions on its 
success. Therefore, an analyst more bullish and confident will reach a value far from an 
internet-sceptic analyst.  
Thus was it of such importance to run a multiple scenario analysis, this put in contrast 
different looks at LinkedIn’s future success (or lack thereof). The goal was to present a 
truly unbiased final outcome, leaving the choice to the investor’s risk profile. 
By excluding the extreme results of Transaction and MAU multiples, chart 8 shows 
summary results from this dissertation. Although Multiple analysis in the specific case of 
LinkedIn has the limitations already mentioned in previous chapters, the average between 
the results of Enterprise Value and Equity Multiples yields an average of $ 179,57, which 
is remarkably close to the base case scenario price. 
The comparison with J. P. Morgan put in contrast a more optimistic outlook on LinkedIn’s 
future. With similar assumptions (in terms of variables such as discount rate and growth 
rate in perpetuity) J. P. Morgan reached a much higher expected price for LinkedIn due 
to its expectations on revenues. 




Chart 8 - Summary Results 
 
Therefore, it is the conclusion of this dissertation that LinkedIn is currently (as of 
December 1st 2015) Overvalued and the recommendation is of a Sell rating (based on the 
Base Case scenario developed in this dissertation’s model). Hence it is expected that until 
December 2016 LinkedIn’s per share price is to drop from it’s current $ 249,46 to the 
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Appendix 1 – Reported Income Statements 2006-2014 
in millions ($) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Revenue 9,80  32,50  78,80  120,10  243,10  522,20  972,30        1.528,50  2.218,80  
Cost of Sales 2,00    7,40       18,60     25,90       44,80       81,40       125,50           202,90         293,80         
Gross Profit 7,80    25,10     60,20     94,30       198,30     440,70     846,80           1.325,60     1.925,00     
Gross Margin 80% 77% 76% 79% 82% 84% 87% 86,7% 86,8%
Operating Expenses 3,80    11,80     30,00     46,30       94,00       239,60     453,09           747,44         1.116,06     
Operating Margin 39% 36% 38% 39% 39% 46% 47% 48,9% 50,3%
R&D 4,40    11,60     29,40     39,40       65,10       132,20     257,20           395,60         536,20         
EBITDA 0,40 - 1,70     0,80     8,60        39,20     68,90     136,51        182,56      272,74      
EBITDA Margin -4% 5% 1% 7% 16% 13% 14% 11,9% 12,3%
Depreciation/Amortization 1,00    2,10       6,40       11,90       19,60       43,10       79,80             134,50         236,90         
EBIT 1,40 - 0,40 -    5,60 -    3,30 -       19,60     25,80     56,71           48,06         35,84         
Taxes -       -          0,30       0,80          3,60          11,00       19,85             16,82           46,50           
Interest -       -          1,30       0,40          0,30 -         2,80 -         0,20               1,40             4,90 -            
Net Income 1,40 - 0,40 -    4,60 -    3,70 -       15,70     12,00     37,06           32,64         15,56 -        
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Appendix 2 – Reported Balance Sheet 2009-2014 
 
in millions ($) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Assets 148,6  238,2  873,8    1.382,4   3.352,8    5.427,3   
Cash and Equivalents 89,98   92,95   577,51  749,55    2.329,30  3.443,3    
Accounts Receivable 24,30   58,30   111,40  203,60    302,20     449,0       
Deferred Commissions 3,0       8,7       13,6       30,2         47,5          66,6         
Prepaid Expenses 2,2       4,9       10,8       14,3         32,1          53,0         
Other Current Assets 1,74     7,42     12,71    21,07       44,40        110,2       
Total Current Assets 121,2  172,3  726,0    1.018,8   2.755,5    4.122,1   
Property and Equipment 25,7     56,7     114,9    186,7       361,7        740,9       
Goodwill -        -        12,20    115,20    150,90     356,7       
Intangible Assets 0,3       5,2       8,1         32,8         43,0          131,3       
Other Assets 1,4       4,0       12,6       28,9         41,7          76,3         
Liabilities 51,5     114,0  248,7    473,9      718,3       2.096,4   
Accounts Payable 4,90     12,90   28,20    53,60       66,70        100,3       
Accrued Liabilities 18,40   27,60   58,60    104,10    183,00     260,2       
Deferred Revenue 26,0     65,0     139,8    257,7       392,2        522,3       
Total Currrent Liabilities 49,3     105,5  226,6    415,4      641,9       882,8      
Long Term Debt -        -        -         -            -             1.081,6    
Deferred Tax Liabilities 0,5       6,6       18,6       27,7         14,9          -            
Other Long Term Liabilities 1,7       1,9       3,5         30,8         61,5          132,1       
Stockholder's Equity 97,0     124,2  624,9    908,5      2.634,3    3.330,8   
Noncontrolling Interest -        -        -         -            5,00          5,4           
Additional Paid-in capital 13,70   25,10   617,60  879,30    2.573,40  3.285,7    
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income -        -        0,1         0,3           0,3            0,2 -          
Accumulated Earnings 20,10 -  4,70 -    7,20       28,90       55,60        39,9         
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Appendix 3 – Forecasted Net Working Capital 2015-2025 
 
  
in millions ($) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Current Assets 804,68       1.042,63   1.284,13   1.538,55   1.806,44   2.088,38   2.384,96   2.696,79   3.024,52   3.368,82   3.730,37   
Accounts Receivable 646,12         837,17         1.031,08     1.235,37     1.450,47     1.676,85     1.914,99     2.165,37     2.428,52     2.704,97     2.995,28     
Other Current Assets 158,57         205,46         253,04         303,18         355,97         411,53         469,97         531,42         596,00         663,85         735,09         
Current Liabilities 518,69       672,06       827,73       991,73       1.164,41   1.346,14   1.537,31   1.738,31   1.949,56   2.171,49   2.404,55   
Accounts Payable 144,31         186,99         230,30         275,93         323,97         374,53         427,72         483,65         542,42         604,17         669,01         
Accrued Liabilities 374,37         485,08         597,43         715,80         840,44         971,61         1.109,59     1.254,67     1.407,14     1.567,32     1.735,54     
Net Working Capital 286,00         370,56         456,40         546,82         642,03         742,24         847,65         958,48         1.074,96     1.197,32     1.325,83     
Variation 87,23           84,57           85,83           90,43           95,21           100,20         105,41         110,83         116,48         122,37         128,50         
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Appendix 4 – Forecasted Base Case Revenue 2015-2025 
 
  
in millions ($) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Talent Solutions 1.872,6   2.503,7   3.143,2   3.816,5   4.525,1   5.270,4     6.053,9     6.877,1     7.741,7     8.649,3     9.601,6     
Marketing Solutions 704,5      866,0      1.024,6   1.191,4   1.366,8   1.551,0     1.744,5     1.947,6     2.160,8     2.384,3     2.618,6     
Premium Subscriptions 615,5      766,9      926,9      1.096,1   1.275,0   1.464,1     1.663,8     1.874,6     2.097,2     2.332,0     2.579,8     
Total 3.192,5   4.136,6   5.094,7   6.104,1   7.167,0   8.285,5     9.462,2     10.699,4   11.999,6   13.365,6   14.800,0   
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Appendix 5 – Forecasted Bad Case Revenue 2015-2025 
  
in millions ($) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Talent Solutions 1.872,6   2.245,0   2.611,3   2.996,4   3.401,0   3.825,9     4.271,9     4.739,9     5.230,7     5.745,4     6.284,7     
Marketing Solutions 704,5      743,4      772,6      802,9      834,3      866,7        900,4        935,2        971,3        1.008,7     1.047,5     
Premium Subscriptions 615,5      698,8      786,9      880,3      979,2      1.083,9     1.194,8     1.312,2     1.436,4     1.567,8     1.706,9     
Total 3.192,5   3.687,2   4.170,9   4.679,6   5.214,4   5.776,5     6.367,1     6.987,3     7.638,5     8.321,9     9.039,0     
LinkedIn Corp                                                               Equity Valuation 
59 
 
Appendix 6 – Forecasted Good Case Revenue 2015-2025 
  
in millions ($) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Talent Solutions 1.872,6   2.762,4   3.675,1   4.636,7   5.649,3   6.715,0     7.835,9     9.014,4     10.252,7   11.553,2   12.918,6   
Marketing Solutions 704,5      1.070,2   1.444,5   1.838,9   2.254,3   2.691,5     3.151,4     3.634,9     4.143,1     4.676,9     5.237,3     
Premium Subscriptions 615,5      835,0      1.066,9   1.312,0   1.570,9   1.844,2     2.132,7     2.437,0     2.757,9     3.096,2     3.452,6     
Total 3.192,5   4.667,6   6.186,5   7.787,6   9.474,5   11.250,7   13.120,0   15.086,3   17.153,7   19.326,3   21.608,5   
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Appendix 7 – Forecasted Balance Sheet 2015-2025 
 
  
in millions ($) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Assets 7.257,4   7.891,1   8.602,9    9.424,9    9.294,7    11.044,9    12.621,3    14.194,7    16.250,4    18.600,5    21.288,8    
Cash and Equivalents 4.559,3    4.500,7    4.509,8     4.591,5     3.681,8     4.611,7      5.325,1      5.991,2      7.093,3      8.441,6      10.078,0    
Accounts Receivable 646,1       837,2       1.031,1     1.235,4     1.450,5     1.676,9      1.915,0      2.165,4      2.428,5      2.705,0      2.995,3      
Deferred Commissions 95,8         124,1       152,8        183,1        215,0        248,6         283,9         321,0         360,0         400,9         444,0         
Prepaid Expenses 76,2         98,8         121,6        145,7        171,1        197,8         225,9         255,5         286,5         319,1         353,4         
Other Current Assets 158,6       205,5       253,0        303,2        356,0        411,5         470,0         531,4         596,0         663,8         735,1         
Total Current Assets 5.536,0   5.766,2   6.068,4    6.458,9    5.874,4    7.146,5      8.219,9      9.264,4      10.764,3    12.530,5    14.605,7    
Property and Equipment 1.066,1    1.381,3    1.701,3     2.038,3     2.393,2     2.766,8      3.159,7      3.572,8      4.007,0      4.463,1      4.942,1      
Goodwill 356,7       356,7       356,7        356,7        356,7        356,7         356,7         356,7         356,7         356,7         356,7         
Intangible Assets 188,9       244,7       301,4        361,1        424,0        490,2         559,8         633,0         710,0         790,8         875,6         
Other Assets 109,7       142,2       175,1        209,8        246,3        284,8         325,2         367,7         412,4         459,3         508,6         
Liabilities 2.624,4   3.080,6   3.543,6    4.031,4    3.463,5    4.695,2      5.627,9      6.407,4      7.507,1      8.716,6      10.060,5    
Accounts Payable 144,3       187,0       230,3        275,9        324,0        374,5         427,7         483,6         542,4         604,2         669,0         
Accrued Liabilities 374,4       485,1       597,4        715,8        840,4        971,6         1.109,6      1.254,7      1.407,1      1.567,3      1.735,5      
Deferred Revenue 751,5       973,7       1.199,3     1.436,9     1.687,1     1.950,4      2.227,4      2.518,6      2.824,7      3.146,2      3.483,9      
Total Currrent Liabilities 1.270,2   1.645,8   2.027,0    2.428,6    2.851,5    3.296,5      3.764,7      4.256,9      4.774,2      5.317,7      5.888,4      
Long Term Debt 1.081,6    1.081,6    1.081,6     1.081,6     -             691,1         1.055,2      1.236,8      1.708,1      2.257,6      2.908,2      
Deferred Tax Liabilities 82,6         107,0       131,7        157,8        185,3        214,3         244,7         276,7         310,3         345,6         382,7         
Other Long Term Liabilities 190,1       246,3       303,3        363,4        426,7        493,3         563,3         637,0         714,4         795,7         881,1         
Stockholder's Equity 4.632,5   4.810,7   5.059,1    5.393,7    5.830,7    6.349,5      6.993,1      7.786,9      8.743,7      9.883,8      11.228,7    
Noncontrolling Interest 5,4           5,4           5,4            5,4            5,4            5,4              5,4              5,4              5,4              5,4              5,4              
Additional Paid-in capital 4.405,9    4.405,9    4.405,9     4.405,9     4.405,9     4.405,9      4.405,9      4.405,9      4.405,9      4.405,9      4.405,9      
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income 0,3 -          0,4 -          0,5 -           0,5 -           0,6 -           0,7 -             0,8 -             1,0 -             1,1 -             1,2 -             1,3 -             
Accumulated Earnings 221,5       399,7       648,2        982,9        1.420,0     1.938,9      2.582,6      3.376,6      4.333,4      5.473,7      6.818,7      
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in millions ($) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue 3.192,54   4.136,56     5.094,69   6.104,10   7.166,95   8.285,53     9.462,18     10.699,36   11.999,61   13.365,58   14.800,03   
Cost of Sales 422,74          547,74            674,61          808,27          949,00          1.097,12        1.252,92        1.416,74        1.588,91        1.769,79        1.959,73        
Gross Profit 2.769,80      3.588,82        4.420,08      5.295,83      6.217,95      7.188,41        8.209,25        9.282,61        10.410,69      11.595,79      12.840,30      
Gross Margin 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8%
Operating Expenses 1.450,46      1.834,06        2.210,97      2.590,59      2.972,28      3.245,98        3.590,48        3.949,63        4.283,12        4.607,68        4.920,37        
Operating Margin 48,0% 47,0% 46,0% 45,0% 44,0% 43,0% 42,0% 41,0% 40,0% 39,0% 38,0%
R&D 700,00          906,99            1.117,07      1.338,39      1.571,44      1.816,70        2.074,69        2.345,95        2.631,05        2.930,55        3.245,07        
EBITDA 619,35       847,77         1.092,04   1.366,85   1.674,23   2.125,74     2.544,09     2.987,03     3.496,52     4.057,56     4.674,86     
EBITDA Margin 19,4% 20,5% 21,4% 22,4% 23,4% 25,7% 26,9% 27,9% 29,1% 30,4% 31,6%
Depreciation/Amortization 340,87          441,66            543,96          651,73          765,21          884,64            1.010,27        1.142,36        1.281,19        1.427,04        1.580,19        
EBIT 278,48       406,11         548,09       715,12       909,02       1.241,09     1.533,82     1.844,67     2.215,33     2.630,52     3.094,67     
Taxes 97,47            142,14            191,83          250,29          318,16          434,38            536,84            645,63            775,37            920,68            1.083,13        
Interest 81,96 -           110,12 -           132,59 -         156,26 -         181,18 -         316,80 -           383,64 -           437,11 -           516,72 -           604,90 -           703,65 -           
Net Income 99,05          153,85         223,67       308,57       409,69       489,91         613,34         761,92         923,24         1.104,94     1.307,89     
Depreciation/Amortization 340,87          441,66            543,96          651,73          765,21          884,64            1.010,27        1.142,36        1.281,19        1.427,04        1.580,19        
Net Working Capital 87,23            84,57              85,83            90,43            95,21            100,20            105,41            110,83            116,48            122,37            128,50            
CAPEX 429,14          416,03            422,25          444,84          468,40          492,95            518,55            545,22            573,02            601,98            632,16            
FCFF 98,01          264,05         431,21       605,88       801,71       981,81         1.210,47     1.469,90     1.747,90     2.052,36     2.384,42     
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in millions ($) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue 3.192,54   3.687,23     4.170,88   4.679,58   5.214,42   5.776,52     6.367,07     6.987,29     7.638,46     8.321,91     9.039,04     
Cost of Sales 422,74          488,24            552,28          619,64          690,46          764,89            843,09            925,21            1.011,44        1.101,94        1.196,90        
Gross Profit 2.769,80      3.198,99        3.618,60      4.059,94      4.523,96      5.011,63        5.523,98        6.062,07        6.627,02        7.219,98        7.842,15        
Gross Margin 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8%
Operating Expenses 1.450,46      1.586,01        1.702,60      1.809,17      1.956,73      2.051,58        2.163,19        2.357,81        2.462,27        2.557,43        2.640,80        
Operating Margin 48,0% 46,0% 44,0% 42,0% 41,0% 41,0% 40,0% 40,0% 39,0% 38,0% 37,0%
R&D 700,00          808,47            914,51          1.026,05      1.143,32      1.266,57        1.396,05        1.532,04        1.674,82        1.824,67        1.981,91        
EBITDA 619,35       804,52         1.001,48   1.224,72   1.423,90   1.693,49     1.964,74     2.172,23     2.489,93     2.837,87     3.219,44     
EBITDA Margin 19,4% 21,8% 24,0% 26,2% 27,3% 29,3% 30,9% 31,1% 32,6% 34,1% 35,6%
Depreciation/Amortization 340,87          393,68            445,32          499,64          556,74          616,76            679,81            746,03            815,55            888,53            965,09            
EBIT 278,48       410,83         556,16       725,08       867,16       1.076,73     1.284,93     1.426,20     1.674,37     1.949,35     2.254,34     
Taxes 97,47            143,79            194,66          253,78          303,51          376,86            449,73            499,17            586,03            682,27            789,02            
Interest 81,96 -           110,12 -           132,59 -         156,26 -         181,18 -         316,80 -           383,64 -           437,11 -           516,72 -           604,90 -           703,65 -           
Net Income 99,05          156,92         228,92       315,05       382,48       383,08         451,57         489,92         571,62         662,18         761,68         
Depreciation/Amortization 340,87          393,68            445,32          499,64          556,74          616,76            679,81            746,03            815,55            888,53            965,09            
Net Working Capital 87,23            84,57              85,83            90,43            95,21            100,20            105,41            110,83            116,48            122,37            128,50            
CAPEX 429,14          368,05            371,59          391,38          412,02          433,54            455,97            479,35            503,72            529,11            555,57            
FCFF 98,01          267,12         388,49       513,73       622,41       666,50         780,81         867,43         999,94         1.143,96     1.299,70     
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in millions ($) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue 3.192,54   4.667,57     6.186,47   7.787,61   9.474,49   11.250,72   13.120,03   15.086,34   17.153,69   19.326,28   21.608,48   
Cost of Sales 422,74          618,05            819,17          1.031,19      1.254,55      1.489,75        1.737,28        1.997,64        2.271,39        2.559,07        2.861,26        
Gross Profit 2.769,80      4.049,52        5.367,29      6.756,43      8.219,94      9.760,96        11.382,76      13.088,70      14.882,30      16.767,21      18.747,21      
Gross Margin 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8% 86,8%
Operating Expenses 1.450,46      2.036,96        2.589,46      3.114,54      3.703,36      4.295,99        4.864,38        5.597,43        6.173,21        6.739,09        7.291,49        
Operating Margin 48,0% 46,0% 44,0% 42,0% 41,0% 41,0% 40,0% 40,0% 39,0% 38,0% 37,0%
R&D 700,00          1.023,42        1.356,45      1.707,52      2.077,39      2.466,85        2.876,72        3.307,85        3.761,14        4.237,51        4.737,90        
EBITDA 619,35       989,14         1.421,38   1.934,36   2.439,19   2.998,12     3.641,67     4.183,42     4.947,95     5.790,62     6.717,82     
EBITDA Margin 19,4% 21,2% 23,0% 24,8% 25,7% 26,6% 27,8% 27,7% 28,8% 30,0% 31,1%
Depreciation/Amortization 340,87          498,35            660,53          831,48          1.011,59      1.201,23        1.400,82        1.610,76        1.831,49        2.063,46        2.307,12        
EBIT 278,48       490,79         760,85       1.102,88   1.427,60   1.796,89     2.240,85     2.572,66     3.116,46     3.727,16     4.410,70     
Taxes 97,47            171,77            266,30          386,01          499,66          628,91            784,30            900,43            1.090,76        1.304,51        1.543,74        
Interest 81,96 -           110,12 -           132,59 -         156,26 -         181,18 -         316,80 -           383,64 -           437,11 -           516,72 -           604,90 -           703,65 -           
Net Income 99,05          208,89         361,97       560,62       746,76       851,18         1.072,91     1.235,12     1.508,97     1.817,76     2.163,31     
Depreciation/Amortization 340,87          498,35            660,53          831,48          1.011,59      1.201,23        1.400,82        1.610,76        1.831,49        2.063,46        2.307,12        
Net Working Capital 87,23            84,57              85,83            90,43            95,21            100,20            105,41            110,83            116,48            122,37            128,50            
CAPEX 429,14          472,72            482,12          508,02          535,02          563,17            592,50            623,07            654,92            688,10            722,67            
FCFF 98,01          319,09         626,21       974,50       1.318,54   1.589,45     1.986,64     2.333,64     2.802,02     3.315,48     3.876,26     
LinkedIn Corp                                                               Equity Valuation 
64 
 








in millions ($) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Sales and Marketing 1.006,8  1.244,3  1.463,9  1.671,0  1.913,8  2.138,0  2.360,8  2.667,2  2.889,6  3.105,4  3.415,2  
General and Administrative 443,7     548,4     645,2     736,4     843,4     942,3     1.040,4  1.175,5  1.273,5  1.368,6  1.505,1  
Operating Expenses 1.450,5  1.792,7  2.109,1  2.407,5  2.757,3  3.080,3  3.401,2  3.842,6  4.163,1  4.474,0  4.920,4  
Percentage of Revenues 48% 47% 46% 45% 44% 43% 42% 41% 40% 39% 38%
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Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
0 114,58$    141,47$    197,76$    242,68$    290,00$    339,83$    392,27$    447,43$    505,43$    566,39$    630,43$    
1 141,47$    197,76$    242,68$    290,00$    339,83$    392,27$    447,43$    505,43$    566,39$    630,43$    697,67$    
2 150,09$    209,81$    257,46$    307,67$    360,53$    416,16$    474,68$    536,21$    600,88$    668,82$    740,16$    
3 177,46$    248,08$    304,42$    363,78$    426,29$    492,07$    561,26$    634,02$    710,48$    790,81$    875,16$    
4 181,52$    253,75$    311,39$    372,11$    436,04$    503,33$    574,11$    648,53$    726,74$    808,91$    895,20$    
5 175,73$    245,65$    301,45$    360,23$    422,12$    487,25$    555,77$    627,82$    703,53$    783,08$    866,61$    
over 5 years 993,73$    1.389,15$ 1.704,66$ 2.037,06$ 2.387,06$ 2.755,41$ 3.142,88$ 3.550,28$ 3.978,46$ 4.428,27$ 4.900,64$ 
Total 1.820,00$ 2.544,20$ 3.122,06$ 3.730,85$ 4.371,86$ 5.046,49$ 5.756,14$ 6.502,29$ 7.286,48$ 8.110,31$ 8.975,45$ 
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Appendix 14 – Sensitivity Analysis Tables 
 
Table 17 - Steady State Growth and Cost of Equity 
 
Table 18 - Probability of Default and Cost of Default 
g/Re 7,82% 8,32% 8,82% 9,32% 9,82% 10,32% 10,82% 11,32% 11,82%
0,8% 211,62$ 196,85$ 183,99$ 172,72$ 162,76$    153,91$ 146,00$ 138,89$ 132,47$ 
1,3% 221,42$ 204,99$ 190,84$ 178,52$ 167,71$    158,16$ 149,67$ 142,08$ 135,25$ 
1,8% 232,84$ 214,39$ 198,65$ 185,08$ 173,27$    162,91$ 153,75$ 145,60$ 138,32$ 
2,3% 246,34$ 225,35$ 207,67$ 192,58$ 179,57$    168,25$ 158,31$ 149,52$ 141,70$ 
2,8% 262,52$ 238,29$ 218,18$ 201,24$ 186,77$ 174,30$ 163,43$ 153,90$ 145,47$ 
3,3% 282,28$ 253,81$ 230,60$ 211,32$ 195,08$    181,21$ 169,24$ 158,82$ 149,67$ 
3,8% 306,95$ 272,77$ 245,49$ 223,24$ 204,76$    189,18$ 175,88$ 164,40$ 154,40$ 
4,3% 338,64$ 296,44$ 263,68$ 237,53$ 216,19$    198,47$ 183,53$ 170,77$ 159,76$ 
4,8% 380,82$ 326,83$ 286,39$ 254,98$ 229,91$    209,45$ 192,45$ 178,12$ 165,88$ 
Prob/Cost 10,00% 20,00% 30,00% 40,00% 50,00% 60,00% 70,00% 80,00% 90,00% 100,00%
10,0% 195,19$ 193,51$ 191,82$ 190,14$ 188,46$ 186,77$ 185,09$ 183,40$ 181,72$ 180,04$ 
20,0% 190,14$ 186,77$ 183,40$ 180,04$ 176,67$ 173,30$ 169,93$ 166,57$ 163,20$ 
30,0% 181,72$ 176,67$ 171,62$ 166,57$ 161,52$ 156,46$ 151,41$ 146,36$ 
40,0% 169,93$ 163,20$ 156,46$ 149,73$ 142,99$ 136,26$ 129,52$ 
50,0% 154,78$ 146,36$ 137,94$ 129,52$ 121,10$ 112,68$ 
60,0% 136,26$ 126,16$ 116,05$ 105,95$ 95,85$   
70,0% 114,37$ 102,58$ 90,80$   79,01$   
80,0% 89,11$   75,64$   62,17$   
90,0% 60,49$   45,33$   
100,0% 28,49$   
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Appendix 15 – Debt Rating and Default Probability Tables 
 
 
greater than ≤ to Rating is Spread is Bankruptcy Probability
-100000 0,499999 D2/D 12,00% 100%
0,5 0,799999 C2/C 10,00% 85%
0,8 1,249999 Ca2/CC 8,00% 70,00%
1,25 1,499999 Caa/CCC 7,00% 59,01%
1,5 1,999999 B3/B- 6,00% 45,00%
2 2,499999 B2/B 5,00% 36,80%
2,5 2,999999 B1/B+ 4,00% 25,00%
3 3,499999 Ba2/BB 3,25% 16,63%
3,5 3,9999999 Ba1/BB+ 2,75% 10,00%
4 4,499999 Baa2/BBB 1,75% 7,54%
4,5 5,999999 A3/A- 1,20% 2,50%
6 7,499999 A2/A 1,00% 0,66%
7,5 9,499999 A1/A+ 0,90% 0,60%
9,5 12,499999 Aa2/AA 0,70% 0,51%
12,5 100000 Aaa/AAA 0,40% 0,07%
Table 19 - Debt Rating and Default Probability based on Interest Coverage Ratio 
